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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations (UN), in its life of forty-eight years, has faced several
challenges' as promoter of human rights in international arena. One such
challenge has been to ensure that even non-state actors such as transnational
corporations (TNCs) 2 respect human rights, at least within their respective
spheres of activity. The UN, in a way, was alive to this when it constituted a
Commission on Transnational Corporations in the mid-70s.3 Though the vision
of the Commission to draft an agreeable code for TNCs failed to materialize
due to various reasons,4 the UN continued to pursue the issue of social
responsibility of TNCs in different forms and forums.5 The approval of the
Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms/Norms) by the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights6 in August 2003
represents a new vigor on the part of the UN in regulating corporate human
rights abuses. This development, together with the launch of Global Compact,7
1. The challenges related not only to ascertaining the "content" of human rights, but also to their
effective "enforcement."
2. The United Nations preferred the usage of the terms TNCs to multinational corporations
(MNCs) or supranational entities. See generally CYNTHIA D. WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 10-12 (Martinus Nijhoff 1983).
3. E.S.C. RES. 1913, U.N. ESCOR, 57TH Sess., Supp. No. 21, at IA, U.N. Doc. E/5570/Add 1
(1974).
4. See PETER MUCHLINSKI,, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAw 593-96 (Blackwell
Publishers 1995).
5. Since 1993, the issues related with TNCs are dealt with by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The issue of TNCs' social responsibility, including the obligation to
observe human rights norms, is squarely dealt with in at least two of the papers issued by the UNCATD. See
generally Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
at 8 (1999), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//poiteiitm2l.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003); see
Social Responsibility, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD _ITEI/22 (2001),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//pstieiitd22.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003). Presently, the
Sub-Commission of Human Rights deals with TNCs and the interactions of trade and human rights, which
in turn has constituted a working group on TNCs.
6. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 55th
Sess., Agenda Item 4, 1, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/64155e7e814 lb38c 1256d63002c55e8?Opendocument (last visited Jan.
31, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Norms].
7. The U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed the Global Compact, consisting of nine
principles in the areas of human rights, labor and environment, on January 31, 1999 at the World Economic
Forum in Davos. The Compact calls upon business enterprises to embrace, support, and enact a set of core
values in the above three areas. See Alexis M. Taylor, The UN and the Global Compact, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 975, 978-79 (2001).
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clearly reflects the necessity as well as urgency on part of the UN to revive its
relevance8 in a new world order in which states no longer enjoy the monopoly
as violators of human rights.9
The UN Norms, however, have not received the attention of academia they
deserved; the release/approval of the Norms is not followed by the searching
academic critiques.' Though the Norms undoubtedly represent an improve-
ment in terms of both formulation and implementation of human rights
standards over earlier such attempts at the international level, they still fall
short of what is required for evolving an effective international regulatory
regime of corporate human rights responsibility. In this article, I intend to
analyze the provisions as well as omissions of the UN Norms. The central
objective of the analysis is to highlight the operational shortcomings, and also
explore the possible approaches that could be taken to remedy them before the
Norms come up for consideration and further action before the UN Commission
on Human Rights in March 2004. By way of caveat, it should be noted that I
do not make any claim of offering final and/or detailed solutions to such
shortcomings, the primary idea being to put an academic debate into motion.
8. Global Compact: Report on Progress and Activities (Draft), at 3 (2002), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/hometglobal-compact/ProgressReport%20July%203.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,2004)
[hereinafter Compact Progress Report]. Being alive to changing needs, the General Assembly of the UN has
now passed a resolution authorizing continued engagement of the UN with the private sector, including the
Global Compact initiative; Towards Global Partnerships, G.A. Res. 55/215, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., at 2,
U.N. Doc A155/228 (2000).
9. This is clear from two facts. First, since the early 90s there has been a spur in cases filed against
TNCs for human rights abuses all over the world generally and in the US, particularly under the Alien Tort
Claims Act. See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights,
20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 51-53 (2002); Aaron X. Fellmeth, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: A New
Standard for the Enforcement of international Law in the U.S. Courts?, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 241,
244-45 (2002); Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They be Held Liable Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 927, 958-64 (1998); John C.
Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463,
464-65 (2000); Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It and Why the United States Shouldn't: The United States'
International Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountablefor Their Labor Rights Violations Abroad, 11 DEPAUL
Bus. L.J. 395,400-11 (1999); Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon- An
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 131-36 (2002); Mahmood Monshipouri et al., Multinational Corporations and the
Ethics of Global Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 965, 973-77 (2003). Second,
of the largest 100 economies in the world, fifty-one are TNCs and only forty-nine are states. Nicola Jagers,
The Legal Status of the Multinational Corporation UnderlInternational Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 260 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999). The 2003
survey shows that there are now seventy-two TNCs in the list of 100 largest economic entities. Paul Sheehan,
A Rising Force in Capital and Culture, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 3-4, 2004, at 21. See also Sarah
Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/top200.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
10. Infra note 15.
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I begin in Part HI by briefly explaining how the Norms make a departure
from the past, and could be characterized, in view of such departure, as an
improvement over their predecessor as well as other current regulatory regimes
of corporate human rights responsibility. Part III first reviews the human rights
obligations of TNCs as laid down in the Norms, and then highlights the two
operational difficulties that they might face: the one of which is the result of
(over)-reference to international human rights instruments whereas the other
relate to putting universal standards of human rights into practice. Regarding
the first issue, I will argue it is desirable that the human rights obligations of
TNCs are enumerated, as far as possible and in an inclusive manner, in a
schedule to the Norms. As far as the second difficulty is concerned, despite a
claim for universality of human rights and the common standards flowing from
such universality, it is necessary for the UN Norms to acknowledge a
distinction between, what I term, "aspirational" and "operational" standards of
human rights. The former signifies general objectives whereas the latter
translates those objectives into concrete measurable units. The Norms could
possibly lay down only the aspirational standards, the exact contours of which
are to be determined by making further rules at municipal levels.
The provisions of the Norms related to implementation of TNCs' human
rights obligations are dealt with in Part IV. Though the Norms make a
promising start by employing multiple monitoring techniques both at national
and international levels, they neither invoke multiple sanctions to enforce
obligations against TNCs nor go far enough in establishing a vigorous
enforcement mechanism. Moreover, it is equally vital that the Norms also
devote some attention to the procedural issues associated with implementation
of human rights standards. It is fundamental to the success of the UN Norms
that, at least, the rules regarding the application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens and the liability of a parent corporation for human rights violations
by its subsidiaries are reexamined and agreed upon. Part V sums up the
analysis, including the arguments, and also throws some light on the future
treatment of the Norms.
II. NATURE OF UN NORMS: DEPARTURE FROM THE 'PAST'?
The starting point for an analysis of the provisions and omissions of the
UN Norms should be, in my view, the relevance of their place in an interna-
tional mechanism of TNCs' accountability for human rights violations. After
all, what was the need for these new (TNCs would also claim 'additional') 1
11. See e.g., Talking Points on the Draft "Nonns on Responsibilities of Transnational Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights," available at http://209.238.219.1 11/
USCIB-text-Talldng-Points.htm (last visited Feb. 3,2003); USCIB is also critical of the Norms on the ground
that, among others, they (i) blur the line between voluntary and legal actions; (ii) are "predicated on the belief
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norms when various international initiatives already exist? 2 The answer to this
question must be found with reference to the provisions of the Norms as
compared with the provisions of their predecessor13 and other current regulatory
regimes of corporate responsibility.14
The relevance of the UN Norms lies in the fact that they represent a shift
in the paradigms "that have to date dominated the discourse of corporate social
responsibility"' 5 and have been responsible for ineffective regulation of
corporate conduct impinging upon human rights. 6 I argue that the Norms
present the most promising human rights norms for TNCs to date because of at
least six factors. First, instead of being limited to labor and/or environmental
rights, 7 the UN Norms attempt to draw a comprehensive list of human rights
that human rights can best be advanced by circumventing national political and legal frameworks"; (iii)
extend far beyond issues of "basic" human rights; (iv) impose impractical obligations. Compare Sir Geoffrey
Chandler, Commentary on the United States Councilfor International Business 'Talking Points'on the Draft
Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, available at http://209.238.219.11 l/Chandler-commentary-on-USCIB-Talling-Points.htm
(last visited Dec. 23, 2003) (considering USCIB's response to be "misleading and factually inaccurate").
12. See generally ILO's Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422 (2002) [hereinafter Tripartite Declaration]; OECD Declaration and
Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 15 LL.M. 967 (1976), available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/c5ce8ffa4l835d64c 125685 d005300bO/c 125692700623b74c 12
56991003b5147/$FKLFJ00085743.PDF (last visited Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. Besides,
regulatory regimes/initiatives also exist at national and regional levels. See e.g., Alien Tort Claims Act 1789
(US); Commission on Industrial Relations and Industrial Change on Promoting a European Framework for
Corporate Social Responsibility (2001), available at http://www.ibeurope.comfDatabase/Factsheets/
F051csr.htm (ast visited Aug. 30, 2003).
13. A reference could be made to the final draft of the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Cor-
porations proposed in 1990 by the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations. U.N.
ESCOR Commission on Transnational Corporations, Supp. 7, Annex I, at 12-27, U.N. Doc.
E/1983/17/Rev.1 (1983). The Code never came into force. See generally KWAMENA ACQUAAH,
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE NEW REALITY 108-20 (1986);
MUCHLINSKI, supra note 4, at 592-97.
14. OECD Guidelines, supra note 12.
15. Carolin Hillemanns, U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1065, 1068 (2003).
16. See Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and International
Law: Where From Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1-57 (2003). I have argued, in brief, that the existing inter-
national framework of corporate accountability "does not prescribe clear human rights standards, is based
upon flawed premises, relies excessively on states to enforce obligations and offers no sanctions in case of
non-compliance. In sum, the four-fold inadequacy of the system makes it ineffective." Id. at 56.
17. Though the Tripartite Declaration makes a reference that the multinational enterprises "should
respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the corresponding International Covenants adopted
by the General Assembly," the thrust of its provisions is undoubtedly on labor and employment rights. Tri-
partite Declaration, supra notel 2, 1 8. The same could be said about the OECD Guidelines despite the fact
that after the 2000 review a recommendation on human rights finds a place. OECD Guidelines, supra note
12, 111.2.
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obligations. Besides a general obligation "to respect, ensure respect for,
prevent abuse of, and promote human rights recognized in international as well
as national law,""8 the specific obligations relate to the right to equal opportu-
nity and non-discriminatory treatment; the right to security of person; the right
of workers; the respect for national sovereignty and human rights; and the
obligations with regard to consumer and environmental protection. The general
obligation to respect "international human rights" becomes a potent provision
in view of another provision in paragraph 23, which provides that a reference
to "international human rights" in the UN Norms includes all civil, cultural,
economic, political and social rights.
Second, the Preamble to the Norms makes a clear, specific and unequivo-
cal reference to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and other international treaties to deduce obligations for TNCs. 9 This
provides a stronger and more widely accepted basis of human rights responsi-
bility generally, and ajus cogens basis regarding some human rights.20 In view
of the UN Norms' reliance on the said international covenants, one commenta-
tor has concluded that the Norms "thus represent a restatement of existing inter-
national human rights law" which "already does or should apply to companies'
conduct."2 Though an academic argument could be made that the UDHR or
other international covenants apply to non-state actors including TNCs,2 one
should not, however, lose sight of the fact that those international covenants
were never drafted to directly23 apply to TNCs and therefore, nowhere provided
for any enforcement mechanism in case TNCs fail to observe the obligations.24
18. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1.
19. The reference to various international conventions, for the purpose ofreliance, is quite elaborate
and covers a wide range of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. Id., at the pmbl.
20. See generally B. Simma & P. Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens
and General Principles, 12 AusT. Y.B. INT'L L. 82 (1992).
21. Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1070.
22. Louis Henkin argues with reference to the application of UDHR to corporations: 'Every
individual includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no com-
pany, no market, no cyberspace. The Universal Declaration applies to them all." Louis Henkin, The Univer-
sal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 17, 25 (1999). See also
ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 91- 101 (Oxford Univ. 1993) (arguing that the
European Convention of Human Rights and certain UN Conventions cover the protection of human rights
against the actions of private bodies and individuals).
23. However, an argument can be made that the courts have "indirectly" tried to make private actors
accountable, i.e., failure of state to prevent human rights violations by private persons, including corporations,
within its territory amounts to violation of a state's mandate under the international conventions. See e.g.,
Guerra v. Italy, 26 E.H.R.R. 357 (1998). See also David Kinley, Human Rights as Legally Binding orMerely
Relevant?, in COMMERCIAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 25, 40-41 (Stephen Bottomley & David Kinley eds.,
2002); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, Ill YALE L.J.
443, 470 (2001).
24. The International Council on Human Rights Policy report concludes that only the ILO and
Further, the very fact that there is a move towards framing human rights norms
"specifically" directed to TNCs also makes it clear there exist certain gaps in
the prevailing state-focal international regulatory regime.25 The UN Norms,
therefore, do more than merely state the existing; they not only formulate
obligations directed clearly and directly to TNCs but also lay down the
provisions for their implementation.
Third, in terms of the nature of obligations also, the Norms clearly make
an encouraging advancement vis-A-vis the prior or existing corresponding
instruments. As TNCs could violate human rights in several ways (including
by failing to act),26 it is insufficient to draft obligations in conventional "nega-
tive" terms, i.e., that TNCs should/shall not violate human rights. The UN
Norms try to overcome this problem by imposing "positive" obligations on
TNCs. 27 TNCs shall not only refrain from directly or indirectly contributing to,
and benefiting from, human rights violations but also "use their influence in
order to promote and ensure respect for human rights. 28
Fourth, the Norms substitute the conventional approach of "should" with
"shall" in terms of the compliance of the obligation.29 Although it may be
suggested that the change of terminology may not make much difference in
terms of the end result and that strictly speaking the Norms are still not binding,
it is still a positive and definite shift in approach, and should make a difference
when coupled with provisions for implementation of the norms.3" This shift is
OECD enforcement mechanism were designed with companies in mind. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 117 (2002).
25. Steven Ratner argues that "a system in which state is the sole target of international legal
obligations may not be sufficient to protect human rights." Ratner, supra note 23, at 461.
26. Deva, supra note 16, at 8. See also Su-Ping Lu, infra note 138, at 605-06; Andrew Clapham
& Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 339, 348-49 (2001) (examining silent complicity as the basis of liability).
27. This is clear from the use of terms obligation to "promote" and "protect" human rights. U.N.
Norms, supra note 6, 1. Also, the obligation is constructed in terms of not only respecting but also
contributing to the realization of human rights. U.N. Norms, supra note 6,1 12. For an argument why TNCs
should be under positive obligations, see Surya Deva, Human Rights Standards and Multinational
Corporations: Dilemma Between "Home" and "Rome," 7 MEDITERRANEAN J. HUM. RTS. 69,87-89 (2003).
28. Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 4, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/293378ff2003ceb0c1256d7900310d90?Opend
ocument (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Commentary on U.N. Norms]. See also Hillemanns, supra
note 15, at 1073.
29. A shift in approach is visible from the use of the term "shall" in paragraphs 2 through 17 and
19 as well as by the fact that the provisions for implementation are given due importance and place in the
U.N. Norms. U.N. Norms, supra note 6. See also Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1068.
30. It is important to note that paragraph 14 of the final draft of the UN Code of Conduct on
20041 Deva
500 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:493
also a tacit acceptance of the fact that the prevailing "dialogue-cooperation"
based approach of voluntary compliance3 with human rights norms is not
proving to be adequate.32
Fifth, the UN Norms propose specific provisions for implementation of
human rights norms.33 In fact, this is a corollary to the Norms opting for an
obligatory approach to the compliancy of the obligations. Besides asking states
to "establish and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative framework for
ensuring that the Norms ... are implemented by transnational corporations",34
the Norms propose independent and transparent periodic monitoring as well as
verification by national and international (including the UN) mechanisms. 35
This again is a departure from the existing indirect mode of implementation in
which the responsibility of enforcement lies solely and exclusively with states.
A note must be taken of another significant provision of the UN Norms which
provides for prompt, adequate and effective reparation to persons and
communities adversely affected by failure to comply with responsibilities.
36
Sixth, the scope of the Norms is not limited just to TNCs, but also covers
"other business enterprises, 37 that is, any business entity, regardless of its legal
form and/or area of operation, including a partnership, contractor, subcontrac-
tor, supplier, licensee or distributor (hereinafter contractors-suppliers et al).3"
The Norms shall apply to such "other business enterprises" if they have any
relation with a TNC, the impact of its activities is not entirely local, or the
activities involve violations of the right to security outlined in paragraphs 3 and
4.39 Such a wide amplitude of the UN Norms should be seen as a response to
the problem associated in pinning the precise responsibility of a TNC. As in
many situations the apparent violator is not a TNC but its subsidiaries,
contractors or suppliers, should the concerned TNC be allowed to bypass the
Transnational Corporations has chosen "shall" in place of "should." It reads: "Transnational corporations
shall respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries in which they operate." (Emphasis
added). See cases cited supra note 13.
31. See, e.g., Compact Progress Report, supra note 8, at 4. "It [the Global Compact] is a
cooperative framework based on internationally established rights and principles." It must also be noted that
engaging in "policy dialogues" with the business sector is one of the four main areas of activity of the
Compact. Id. See also OECD Guidelines, supra note 12, 1.1.
32. See Mahmood Monshipouri et al., supra note 9, at 979-82. See generally Erin Elizabeth
Macek, infra note 84.
33. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, U 15-19.
34. Id. 117.
35. Id. 16.
36. Id. 18. Compensation not as charity but for violation of a right due to omission of duty is
crucial. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, infra note 130.




liability on technical grounds, e.g., the separation of personality or lack of
control? The Norms, thus, try to overcome this problem by directly and
squarely placing an obligation, that the contractors-suppliers et al4° of a TNC
respect human rights, on the concerned TNC.4 It must be noted that the
obligation of TNCs also extends to ensuring that their contractors-suppliers et
al actually implement the Norms in their respective operations.42 The Norms,
therefore, send a clear message to TNCs: either ensure that the entities with
whom you do business dealings respect human rights or do not deal with them,
for failure to act may attract liability. 3
The above analysis makes it manifest that the UN Norms represent a
progress (and that too in the right direction) over the prevailing regulatory
regimes. At the same time, one should not become unduly optimistic from this
progress. Despite the above vital improvements, as compared with previous
instruments, the Norms still suffer from serious theoretical and operational
shortcomings, both in terms of formulation and implementation of human rights
obligations. These shortcomings, together with the positives, are dealt with
below in the next two parts.
III. FORMULATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
In this section I first intend to briefly analyze the general as well as
specific human rights obligations of TNCs formulated under the UN Norms,
and then examine some of the operational difficulties which they might face.
I also explore the possible theoretical recourse that could help in overcoming
those difficulties. But before proceeding further, two clarifications. First, I
have invoked, wherever considered appropriate, the Commentary on UN Norms
to understand and state human rights obligations of TNCs because the Norms
40. Though the definition of TNC in paragraph twenty is wide enough to cover even the subsidiaries
of a TNC, "subsidiaries" as such are not specifically mentioned along with suppliers-contractors in paragraph
21. It seems, however, that the subsidiaries of a TNC could still be covered, being a "business enterprise"
having a "relation with a transnational corporation". This interpretation could also be supported from the
language used in paragraph 15. U.N. Norms, supra note 6.
41. Paragraph one provides: "... [Wlithin their respective spheres of activity and influence,
transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall have the obligation to promote, secure the
fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as
national law, ... "(emphasis added.) U.N. Norms, supra note 6. See also Hillemanns, supra note 15, at
1072-73.
42. This is clear from a provision regarding implementation, which lays down: "... [e]ach
transnational corporation or other business enterprise shall apply and incorporate these Norms in their
contracts or other arrangements and dealings with contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees,
distributors, or natural or other legal persons that enter into any agreement with the transnational corporation
or business enterprise in order to ensure respect for and implementation of the Norms." (emphasis added.)
U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 15.
43. See Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 18.
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itself consider the Commentary to be "a useful interpretation and elaboration
of the standards contained" therein.' Second, as mentioned before, though the
Norms are directed towards TNCs and other business enterprises, for the sake
of convenience I have used TNCs to indicate both.
A. Human Rights Obligations
1. General Obligations
The UN Norms begin by laying down general obligations in paragraph 1.
The obligations are two-fold: primary45 responsibility of states and "within their
respective spheres of activity and influence" the obligation of TNCs to "pro-
mote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human
rights."46 The general obligations assume more significance because of two
reasons. First, all the Norms that follow are to be interpreted in the light of
these general obligations.47 This interpretational guideline becomes very potent
in view of a broader spectrum of duties conceived herein,' and should go a
long way in a (required) liberal construction of the human rights obligations.
Second, the appended commentary clarifies that the obligations apply to
corporations and other business enterprises irrespective of the fact where they
operate49-whether in home or at 'Rome', that is, the host country."0 This again
tries to address, at least at theoretical level, an issue which should have been the
starting point of any theory of corporate responsibility.
A difficulty may, however, arise in construing what is the "respective
spheres of activity and influence" of TNCs, especially when the Norms do not
prescribe any guidelines. For example, would it include the entire supply
chain, and all the subsidiaries as well as affiliate sister concerns of a TNC?
Moreover, whether the spheres of activity of a TNC engaged in, say, construc-
44. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, at pmbl., 9.
45. Qualifying states' responsibility by 'primary' may, though inadvertently, suggest that the
responsibility of TNCs is secondary. Such an implication is avoidable because in view of TNCs emerging
status, role and place, their responsibility to respect/promote human rights should also be primary in nature.
"Because MNCs have gained powers traditionally vested only in states, they should arguably be held to the
same standards that international law presently imposes upon states." Mahmood Monshipouri et al., supra
note 9, at 966.
46. UN Norms, supra note 6, 1.
47. Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28.
48. See Deva, supra note 27; Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28.
49. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28.
50. Which standards of human rights corporations operating in many countries should follow has
been a critical issue of corporate responsibility debate. See Clare Duffield, Multinational Corporations and
Workers' Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, A DIALOGUE 193 (Stuart Rees &
Shelley Wright eds. 2000); JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETHICS AND THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS 379 (3d ed., 2000).
See also Deva, supra note 27.
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tion work would extend to promoting right to education or privacy generally,
i.e., outside its activity boundary? As TNCs and human rights activists are
likely to plead for opposing interpretations, this aspect requires clarification.
2. Right to Equal Opportunity and Non-Discriminatory Treatment
The UN Norms mandates TNCs to "ensure equality of opportunity and
treatment" in order to eliminate discrimination based on race, color, sex, langu-
age, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, social status, indigen-
ous status, disability or age.5 Besides, there is also a diluted52 obligation to
eliminate discrimination on the ground of health status (including HIV/AIDS),
marital status, capacity to bear children, pregnancy and sexual orientation.53
The measures that accord special protection to children, or are "designed to
overcome past discrimination against certain groups" are, however, considered
not a negation but promotion of equality.54 TNCs are expected to pay special
attention "to the consequences of business activities that may affect the rights
of women", especially regarding conditions of work.55
Though the list of discriminating factors is appreciably extensive, it is
difficult to understand why the obligation is made soft regarding some equally
important variables. For example, despite HIV/AIDS and pregnancy being very
potential reasons for discrimination practiced by corporations all over the
world,5 6 the Norms prescribe no mandatory obligation to desist from such
practices. In one respect however, the Norms deserve credit: an express provi-
sion for taking affirmative action measures to rectify past discrimination. Such
a provision becomes crucial at a time when a fear is expressed that the
assumption of public services by corporations, in view of states resorting to
privatization and disinvestments, will not be accompanied by adoption of
erstwhile states' policies of affirmative actions.5 But it should be noted that
51. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 2.
52. 'Diluted' because the obligation is drafted in terms of 'should' and moreover, laid down under
the commentary as distinguished from the main text of the relevant paragraph.
53. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28.
54. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 2.
55. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 5.
56. A recent survey of almost 8,000 high-level executives from firms in 103 countries revealed that
"fewer than 6 percent of businesses surveyed have an HIV/AIDS-specific written policy that has received
formal approval." David E. Bloom, ET AL., Business and HIV/Aids: Who Me?, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM,
(2003), available at http://www.weforum.orgpdf/Initiatives/GHLBusinessAIDSWhoMe-WAD.pdf (last
visited Dec. 18, 2003). See generally INT'L LAB. OFF., Time for Equality at Work (2003), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/decl/publ/reportsreport4.htrm (last visited Dec. 18, 2003);
Jayanth K Krishnan, The Rights of the New Untouchables: A Constitutional Analysis of HIV Jurisprudence
in India, 25 HuM. RTs. Q. 791-819 (2003).
57. For example, in thecontext ofIndia, wherearts. 15(4) and 16(4)/(4-A)/(4-B) oftheConstitution
provide for special affirmative action provisions for certain under privileged classes of citizens, an argument
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the UN Norms do not make it clear whether this is merely an enabling
provision, or an obligation requiring taking of positive steps.58 In the context
of corporations, a provision for affirmative action would prove more effective
only if it is of the latter category.
3. Right to Security of Person
Paragraph 3 of the UN Norms deals with crimes against the human beings
in violation of international human rights and humanitarian law. TNCs, for
example, shall neither engage nor benefit from war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, torture, forced disappearance, forced or compulsory labor,
hostage-taking, and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.5 9 In
addition, the appended commentary provides that besides not producing or
selling weapons declared illegal under international law, TNCs which produce
and/or supply military, security, or police products/services shall also "take
stringent measures to prevent those products and services from being used to
commit human rights or humanitarian law violations."60 These provisions are
a reflection of the lessons learnt from the trial of several corporations for their
direct or tacit involvement in the commission of above-mentioned heinous
crimes, since the Second World War to the present day.6'
The Norms also contain another provision directed at remedying the
fallouts of security arrangements made by TNCs on human rights.62 "Business
security arrangements shall be used only for preventive or defensive services,"
and the force applied by security personnel shall be proportional and only when
"strictly necessary. ,63 It must also be kept in mind that security personnel do
not violate important rights of workers/employees such as the rights to freedom
of association and peaceful assembly and to engage in collective bargaining.64
Moreover, TNCs shall establish policies to prohibit the hiring of private
is made that the government's policies of liberalization might result in undermining the scope of these
provisions.
58. In the context of provisions for affirmative action in the Indian Constitution, M.P. Singh argues
that those not merely enabling provisions and could be claimed by citizens against state like any other funda-
mental right. M.P. Singh, Are Articles 15(4) and 16(4) Fundamental Rights?, 3 J. SUP. CT. CASES 33 (1994).
Contra Pramanand Singh, 'Fundamental Right to Reservation: A Rejoinder,' 3 J. SUP. CT. CASES 6 (1995).
59. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 3.
60. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 5.
61. See Ratner, supra note 23, at 477-78; Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1073-74; Beth Stephens,
supra note 9, at 49-50; Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'LL. 801,803-07(2002). See also Ramasastry, supra note 9; see generally EDWIN BLACK, IBM
AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA'S MOST
POWERFUL CORPORATION (Three Rivers Press 2001).
62. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 3.
63. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 6.
64. Id.
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militias/paramilitary groups, or working with units of state security forces
known for human rights violations.65 Again, we can see clearly the influence
of the human rights violating activities of Enron and Unocal on the drafting of
these provisions.66
4. Rights of Workers
The UN Norms make elaborate provisions regarding workers' rights.
TNCs are supposed to provide a safe and healthy working environment,67 and
are mandated not to use forced or compulsory labor as forbidden by the relevant
international instruments, national legislations, and international human
rights/humanitarian law. 68 A special provision obligates TNCs to respect the
right of children to be protected from economic exploitation.69 TNCs shall not
only create and implement a plan to eliminate child labor7" but also not employ
any person under the age of 18 in any type of work that is hazardous, interferes
with child's education, or is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or moral of
young persons.7'
Besides the above rights, two more provisions deserve special mention.
First, TNCs shall provide workers with remuneration "that ensures an adequate
65. Id.
66. The report of Human Rights Watch on Enron documents detail how Enron/Dabhol Power
Corporation violated civil-political right with the help on Indian police. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ENRON
CORPORATION: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY INHUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (1999), available at http://www
.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). It should further be noted that one of the charges
leveled against Unocal before the U.S. courts is that it aided/abetted the Burmese military force to carry out
forced dislocation, forced labor, rape, etc. See John Cheverie, United States Court Finds Unocal May be
Liable for Aiding and Abetting Human Rights Abuses in Burma, in 10 HuMAN RIGHTS BRiEF 6 (2002).
67. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 7. The relevant commentary further provides that TNCs "shall
make available information about the health and safety standards relevant to their local activities."
Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 9. Such a provision is very important because most of times
corporations do not disclose information about the possible negative effects of their activities on the
health/safety of employees, consumers and general public. For example, in Bhopal catastrophe the failure
of UCC/UCIL to provide prompt and adequate information about the negative effects of MIC and other gases
proved fatal as far as victims are concerned.
68. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 5. It is also provided that employers shall have resort to prison
labor only as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided that the work/service is carried out
under the supervision and control of a public authority. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 7.
69. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 6. "Economic exploitation" is defined in an expansive manner to
include employment "in a manner that is harmful to their health or development" or in any occupation "before
a child completes compulsory schooling and, except for light work, before the child reaches 15 years of age."
Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 6.
70. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 8.
71. Id. at 7. TNC may, however, employ persons aged 13 to 15 years in light work in national laws
or regulations permit. Id. Such a provision though might be misused by TNCs in view of the fact that they
often enjoy more bargaining power than many developing countries.
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standard of living for them and their families."7" The remuneration should be
freely agreed upon or fixed by national laws/regulation, whichever is higher,
73
and keep in mind the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value.74
Second, the TNCs shall ensure freedom of association and effective recognition
of the right to collective bargaining of their employees/workers, 75 especially in
those countries that do not fully implement international standards concerning
those rights.76 It should be noted that a sincere commitment on the part of
corporations to respect the rights to freedom of association and collective
bargaining could go a long way in protecting rest of the workers' rights.
It is clear from a brief review of workers' rights that the Norms seek to
achieve lofty goals and make extensive provisions to attain those goals. Critics,
however, argue that the intended results might not be achieved as ambiguity in
the provisions affords enough room for corporations not to follow the
provisions in spirit. For example, with the reference to the provision for fair
and reasonable remuneration 77 it is argued that the Norms "leave it open to
anyone to interpret what are an adequate standard of living and ajust wage" and
"continue to base their wage criteria on the notion of national conditions."78
Though the first point regarding ambiguity deserve consideration, a suggestion
for having equal global wages, both in North and South, is more difficult to
defend as well as pursue. Even if workers in North and South work for same
number of hours and under similar circumstances, it will be both unrealistic and
unreasonable to argue that they should be given same wages, for the wages
awarded to workers at any two given places would command different
purchasing power to satisfy basic needs. It is still necessary though to agree on
common variables with reference to which fair and reasonable wages could be
determined at national level. This is further explained below with reference to
a distinction which should be drawn between aspirational and operational
standards of human rights.
72. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 8.
73. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 10.
74. Id. at 10-11.
75. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 9. TNCs are also supposed to respect the right to workers to strike.
Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 11.
76. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 12.
77. On reading paragraph eight with Commentary (a), it seems that remuneration would be "fair
and reasonable" only if it ensures an adequate standard of living for workers and their families. U.N. Norms,
supra note 6, 8.
78. See e.g., THE JUS SEMPER GLOBAL ALLIANCE, LIVING WAGES NORTH AND SOUTH, Corporate
Social Responsibility and Human Rights 2 (2003), available at http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/
Corporate%20Activity/Resources/CSRandHRnorms.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2003).
5. Respect for National Sovereignty and Human Rights
Under the umbrella of "respect for national sovereignty and human rights",
the Norms stipulate obligations on a wide range of issues-from adherence to
rule of law to abstaining from corruption; from promoting right to development
to respect for national laws/regulation; from promoting social, economic and
cultural rights to positive contribution for human rights realization generally.79
The most striking feature of these provisions is their treatment of TNCs,
together with other state organs, as vehicle of developing a society wedded to
rule of law, transparency, accountability and sustainable development and in
which people's civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights are realized.
Despite the fact that TNCs' obligations are subject to the limitations of "their
resources and capabilities,"' it represents a departure from the traditional role
of TNCs in society in at least three respects. First, the human rights obligations
of TNCs instead of being limited to mere civil and political rights now also
encompass second and third generation human rights, that is, both individual
and collective social, economic and cultural rights. Second, the scope of
obligations is clearly broadened; TNCs shall be subject to both negative and
positive obligations. Third, TNCs are expected to respect/promote human
rights not only of those who are affected by their activities directly (workers/
consumers) but also of those affected indirectly, invisibly and/or in the longer
run (society as such).
It will be worthwhile to note some of the obligations which demonstrate
the above shift. TNCs are, for example, expected to enhance the transparency
of their activities in regard to payments made to government/public officials."1
They are also obligated to respect the rights of indigenous people, including "to
own, occupy, develop, control, protect and use their lands, other natural
resources, and other cultural and intellectual property." 2 Moreover, TNCs
shall contribute to the realization, in particular, of the rights to development,
adequate food and drinking water, the highest attainable standard of physi-
cal/mental health, adequate housing, privacy, education, freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, and freedom of opinion and expression. 3
The above provisions undoubtedly reflect a paradigmatic shift in terms of
the appropriate role and place of corporations in society generally and regarding
human rights in particular.8 4 But the Norms merely paint this picture with a
79. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, l 10-12.
80. See Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 12.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id. at 12.
83. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 12.
84. See e.g., Erin Elizabeth Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations have no
Incentive to Define Human Rights, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101 (2002).
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broad brush; it is not clear how TNCs are expected to put these expectations
into practice. Various issues would require clarification or concretization
before TNCs actually deliver the desired goods. For example, whether only
those TNCs whose activities come in direct contact or conflict with certain
human rights are under a positive obligation, or all operating TNCs are under
a general obligation to promote all the human rights? It seems that the Norms
tend to adopt, in my view rightly, the second option, but in that case it will be
necessary that corporate law, which governs the establishment and working of
corporations, both at national and international level is amended to provide for
taking into account the impact of corporate decisions/activities on human rights
in society. The Norms are, however, silent on this issue. Unless it is precisely
clear what we want TNCs to do, any further talks about the efficacy of the
proposed regime will be premature as well as unsound.
6. Obligations with Regard to Consumer Protection
As the activities of corporations also come in conflict with consumers'
various (human) rights, 5 the Norms make specific provision to address this
issue. TNCs shall not only act in accordance with fair business, marketing and
advertising practices, including relating.to competition and anti-trust matters,
but also take all necessary steps to ensure safety/quality of the goods and
services provided.86 An important aspect is that TNCs are also expected to
observe the precautionary principle, 7 and also disclose, in cases where a
product is potentially harmful, all appropriate information on the contents and
possible hazardous effects of the products through proper labeling, informative
and accurate advertising and other appropriate methods.88 These provisions
85. Consumers' rights to information, health and safety, and clean environment are directly affected
by corporate decisions/activities. For example, a study conducted by Chapman & Carter demonstrates how
Australian tobacco industry strived hard to avoid, delay and dilute health warnings on cigarettes. S. Chapman
& S.M. Carter, Avoid Health Warnings on All Tobacco Products for Just as Long as We Can: A History of
Australian Tobacco Industry Efforts to Avoid, Delay and Dilute Health Warnings on Cigarettes, 12 (Suppl
IM) TOBACCO CONTROL J., iiil 3, iiil 3-22 (2003). Also, a recent investigation indicates that pharmaceutical
companies are investing millions of dollars into patient advocacy groups and medical organizations in order
to expand markets for their products. Gary Hughes & Liz Minchin, Drug Firms Fund Disease Awareness,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 13, 2003, at 5, available at http://www.smh.com.au/cgi-bin/common/
popupPrintArticle.plpath=/articles/2003/12/12/1 (last visited Mar. 20,2004); Gary Hughes & Liz Minchin,
Sugar-Coating the Message, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 13, 2003, at 30.
86. U.N. Norms, supra note 6,113. See also Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 15.
87. U.N. Norms, supra note 6,113. See also Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 15.
"Precautionary principle" means that lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a justification for
not taking or delaying a step which could have enhanced the safety/quality of the goods or services, especially
when doing so may result in irreversible harm.
88. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 15.
will become immensely relevant in the time to come, for example, in the
context of genetically modified products, or breast implants technology.
7. Obligations with Regard to Environmental Protection
The UN Norms also respond to the growing concern about corporations'
indifference to sustainable development while taking business decisions as well
as formulating short/long term policies. Accordingly, TNCs shall carry out
their activities in accordance with laws, practices and policies of the country of
operation as well as international agreements, principles and standards regard-
ing environmental perseverance in order to contribute to "the wider goal of
sustainable development."89  TNCs are required to assess periodically the
impact of their activities on environment and human health,9" especially of
certain groups such as children, older person, women and indigenous people.9'
Further, best management practices and technologies must be adopted to reduce
the risk of accidents and damage to the environment.
92
As TNCs operate in countries placed at different levels of development
and consequently having varying levels of environmental standards, it becomes
problematic and often full of business dilemmas as to which standards out of
three-home, host or international-should they follow. Though the Norms
mandate TNCs to observe both international and host standards, in many
situations the host standards are as good as non-existent or are not enforced.93
As far as the international standards are concerned, they are generally so vague
and general that it is quite easy to comply with their words without adhering to
their spirit.94 In such a scenario, it is worth exploring whether TNCs should not
follow the higher of home or host standards, irrespective of the fact where they
operate.95
89. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 14.
90. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 16.
91. Id. TNCs are also required to make the impact reports accessible, in a timely manner, to the
affected groups, concerned national/international institutions and to the general public. Id.
92. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 17.
93. For example, India had no "specific" law dealing with environmental pollution, hazardous
substances, or violations of human rights in 1984, at the time of the Bhopal accident. In fact, the Bhopal
catastrophe led to the enactment of the Environment Protection Act of 1986, the Public Liability Insurance
Act of 1991, and the National Environment Tribunal Act of 1995. Similarly, Myanmar had no law
specifically dealing with the environment, human rights, or forced labor in 1993 when Unocal entered into
a joint venture project in Myanmar. Later, Myanmar passed the Protection of Wild Life, Wild Plants and
Conservation of Natural Areas Law of 1994.
94. It will be overoptimistic to assume that precise environmental obligations for TNCs are
ascertainable. See e.g., Declaration of the United Nations on the Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1 (commonly referred to as the Stockholm Declaration); Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, Aug. 12, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (Vol. I).
95. See generally Deva, supra note 27.
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B. Operational Difficulties: A Response
Despite making a commendable effort to formulate human rights
obligations for TNCs, the UN Norms, in my view, might face several opera-
tional shortcomings. Two of such possible difficulties are dealt with below.
1. (Over)-reference to International Human Rights Law/Instruments?
The Norms make frequent reference to numerous international treaties,
which are negotiated as well as signed by states and are directed primarily
towards states. This approach is problematic due to several reasons. At the
outset, the approach is circular. Instead of laying down ascertainable and guid-
able human rights standards, it leads the consumers of the Norms - from TNCs
to NGOs, states, and victims-to several national and international instruments.
In other words, the questions such as what are the obligations of TNCs in a
given case and whether they violated those obligations cannot be determined
with reference to the UN Norms. Though at places the appended commentary
try to give concrete shape to some of the obligations,96 on the whole that is
highly inadequate. A reference to state oriented international instruments to
deduce TNCs' human rights obligations might present another difficulty when
it comes to TNCs' positive obligations. 97 Whether the positive human rights
obligations of TNCs, especially regarding socio-economic and cultural rights,
are expected to be equivalent to that of states, which were conceived as original
and primary targets of such international instruments? 98 If TNCs' positive
obligations are not as extensive as that of states, which seems to be a more
probable as well as acceptable stand, 99 then it will be logical to stipulate their
obligations separately.
I argue, therefore, that though there is no need to redefine human rights
especially for corporations and it is perfectly legitimate to rely upon interna-
tional instruments 'negotiated-signed-applicable' to states to construct human
96. See e.g., Commentary to U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 7-9.
97. See e.g., Sarah Joseph, Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The "Fourth
Wave" of Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny, 25 HuM. RTS. Q. 425,436-38 (2003) (examining the complex
question which arise regarding the human rights obligations of pharmaceutical companies).
98. For example, a pharmaceutical company should have positive obligations only regarding those
human rights which are directly related to its core business (e.g., right to health), or qua all human rights
generally (e.g., right to adequate housing or food/drinking water).
99. For obvious reasons, TNCs cannot be equated to states as far as the nature and extent of human
rights obligations are concerned. Donaldson argues that "corporation is an economic animal" and therefore,
"it would be unfair, not to mention unreasonable, to hold corporations to the same standards of charity and
love as human individuals." THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 84 (1989).
See also Deva, supra note 27, at 95-96.
rights obligations for TNCs,'00 it may still be necessary to deduce specific
obligations of TNCs with reference to the referred international instruments.
This is also required because TNCs could not possibly violate certain human
rights enumerated in state-focal international treaties."°1 Therefore, in my view,
subject to the limitation regarding putting universality in operation discussed
below, it is desirable that the human rights obligations of TNCs are enumerated,
as far as possible and in an inclusive manner, in a schedule to the Norms.
Doing so will not only bring certainty in terms of what is to be followed and
consequent higher rate of compliance, but will also be an economically efficient
way of regulation.
2. Human Rights Standards: Putting Universality in Operation?
The Norms acknowledge, among others, the universality of human
rights,1 12 which in the context of TNCs also mean that they should observe the
same standards of human rights whether operating in "home" or at "Rome".
Though this article is not the appropriate place to join an already intensive and
extensive debate over universality (or lack of it) of human rights generally, 0 3
I intend to explore this additional TNCs-related dimension of universality
100. Joseph Raz argues that "there is no closed list of duties which correspond to the right .... A
change of circumstances may lead to the creation of new duties based on old right."(emphasis added).
JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 171 (1986).
101. See e.g., Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(l1),
U.N.Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), and Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (N.O. 16), at 52 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
(Mar. 23, 1976) [right to be presumed innocent when charged for a penal offence]; Article 12 of the ICCPR
[liberty to leave and enter his own country]. Steven Ratner, however, contemplates the situations in which
corporation could involve in violation of even such rights. Ratner, supra note 23, at 492-93.
102. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 3. Besides universality, "indivisibility, interdependence and
interrelatedness of human rights" are also acknowledged. Id.
103. Out ofa vast literature, one can refer to: HENRY J. STEINER &PHILIPALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, MORALS, POLITICS 192-255 (1996); Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and
Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AM. POL. So. REV.
303 (1982); Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asian Debate, 15 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L.
1 (1994); Michael Perry, Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19
HUM. RTS. Q. 468 (1997); Abdullahi Ahmad An-Na'im, Human Rights in Muslim World: Socio-Political
Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (1990); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (Sage Pub. 1990); Rein Mulierson,
Universal Human Rights in the Multicultural World: Reasons and Excuses for, and Circumstances
Conducive to their Gross and Systemic Violation, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE
WORLD ORDER 133 (Meghnad Desai & Paul Redfern eds., 1995); Adamantia Pollis, Cultural Relativism
Revisited: Through a State Prism, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 316 (1996); UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 91-118 (2002); Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in HUM.
RTS. L. 117 (PHILIPS ALSTON ed., 1996); and Michael Goodhart, Origin and Universality in the Human
Rights Debate: Cultural Essentialism and the Challenge of Globalisation 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 935 (2003).
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which arise because of the fact that TNCs, unlike states, operate in more than
one country. Agreeing that TNCs shall pay fair and reasonable remuneration,
whether fair and reasonable would quantify into 'same' wages, say, at a factory
in India and in the US? Again agreeing that TNCs shall contribute to the
realization of, say, the right to drinking water (or access to highest attainable
standard of health, for that matter), what type of and level of contamination will
make the water not suitable for 'drinking' (or in case of right to health, by
which yardstick highest attainable standard will be judged)? Such examples,
which could be easily multiplied with reference to various provisions in the
Norms, demonstrate that there are operational difficulties associated with
universal human rights. How such difficulties could be overcome, to the
satisfaction of the affected parties having conflicting interests?
Even if we assume arguendo that human rights are universal, it seems that
in case of many human rights universality is only in terms of aspiration and not
regarding the content ofaspiration; in fact, a push for pressing universality also
regarding the content of rights might result in negation rather than promotion
of human rights. For example, there is a universal right to food but it is
doubtful whether there is a universal right to a particular type of food.
Similarly, the right to safe and healthy working environment or the right to fair
and reasonable subsistence wages is universal only in abstract terms and in each
case the quantification of what is safe and healthy or fair and reasonable is
bound to vary from place to place. Thus, in order to operationalize the abstract
universality and/or to ascertain the content of human rights, certain adjustments
to local social, political, economic and cultural conditions are to be made.1"4
A distinction, therefore, needs to be drawn between aspirational and operational
standards of human rights. A note of caution, however, is required in localizing
the universality in such a manner. As the objective of this exercise is to
promote human rights, it should be ensured that only those local differences are
given weight which help in fulfilling the intended objective; the differences
which do not respect human dignity should be treated as irrelevant.'05
In view of the above distinction proposed between aspirational and
operational standards of human rights, the Norms could only possibly lay down
aspirational standards of human rights. Such aspirational standards would
require to be translated into concrete measurable operational standards at
municipal level. Unfortunately, the Norms do not recognize this distinction and
consequently try to achieve an impossible balance between generality and
104. For example, Shelley Wright argues how local cultural differences might be used to promote
human rights, and a failure to recognize such differences might in fact result in subverting human rights.
SHELLEY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, DECOLONISATION AND GLOBALISATION: BECOMING
HUMAN 88-93, 111, 213-14 (2001).
105. See Deva, supra note 27, at 77-78.
specificity. In the absence of UN Norms not adopting the distinction between
aspirational and operational standards, they might prove ineffective not only in
guiding the conduct of TNCs but also working as touchstone with reference to
which violation of human rights could be measured. Recognition of such a
distinction, on the other hand, is likely to increase the efficacy of the UN
Norms.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Lack of implementation strategy and effective sanctions have been the
most critical lacunae of the existing international regimes of corporate
responsibility for human rights violations.'0 6 Being conscious of this aspect, the
UN Norms, after some initial debate during drafting stage,' make a departure
from the past approach of merely voluntary implementation. Paragraphs 15 to
19 deal with "general provisions of implementation." Out of these, only the
first three paragraphs (15-17) relate to implementation procedures stricto sensu;
while paragraph 18 elaborates the obligation to provide for reparation to the
victims adversely affected by non-compliance with the Norms, paragraph 19
lays down the rule that the Norms shall not be "construed as diminishing,
restricting, or adversely affecting the human rights obligations" of states and/or
TNCs under national or international laws.'0° I begin below with an analysis
of the provisions related to multiple implementation techniques as well as
reparation and then move on to examine some of the lacunae which may
seriously hamper the efficacy of the prescribed implementation mechanism.
106. With reference to the Global Compact, Alston makes an apt remark, which holds true regarding
other regulatory instruments as well: "[T]he more puzzling nature of the proposal [i.e., Global Compact] is
that it reduces the focus to a very soft and dialogue-based effort to promote human rights." (emphasis
added). Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to
Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815, 837 (2002). See also William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human
Rights, the UN Global Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 501,503-04 (2001); and
Letters from Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, to the Global Compact Office (Oct. 21, 2001, Nov. 2001,
Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.lchr.org/workers-rights/wr-other/LCHR to UN -Oct 01 .pdf,
http://www.lchr.org/workers.-rights/wr _ other/LCHR _ to _ UN _ Nov 01 .pdf,
http://www.lchr.org/workers-rights/wr-other/joint-ltr UN 040703.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
107. See Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1068-69.
108. In case of a choice between the Norms and "more protective interests", paragraph nineteen
confers priority on the latter. Commentary (a) to paragraph nineteen also makes it clear by providing that
"[i]f more protective standards are recognized or emerge in international or state law or in industry or
business practices, those more protective standards shall be pursued." Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra
note 28, at 20.
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A. Techniques and Modes of Implementation
The UN Norms try to combine multiple implementation techniques for
ensuring that TNCs comply with their human rights obligations. On a closer
scrutiny of the relevant provisions, one can also notice that these techniques
seek to implement two different types of obligations: direct and indirect. Para-
graphs 15 and 16 are aimed at implementing direct obligations of TNCs and I
will, therefore, call it the "direct mode." The mode is direct because it treats
TNCs under a direct obligation to respect/promote human rights and seeks to
enforce such obligation by invoking internal as well as external techniques.
Paragraph 17, on the other hand, is directed at implementing indirect obliga-
tions, i.e., the obligation of states to ensure that all entities, including TNCs,
within their jurisdiction respect human rights rather than implementing TNCs'
obligations to respect human rights.'0 9 This can, therefore, be termed as "in-
direct mode" to distinguish it from the first one." 0 I believe that the distinction
between the two modes is vital. To draw an analogy, it is the distinction
between saying that minor children shall not drive and that parents shall ensure
that their minor children do not drive. The distinction, in other words, is that
in the former case the proposed mechanism, whether national or international,
will be enforcing obligations imposed directly on TNCs whereas in the latter
what the mechanism will be enforcing is only an intermediary/indirect
obligation, i.e., states' obligation to ensure that TNCs within their territory
respect human rights."'
1. Direct Mode
The direct mode adopts a two-fold strategy of implementation. First,
TNCs "shall adopt, disseminate and implement internal rules of operation in
compliance with the Norms. ' "2 As here the emphasis is on TNCs adopting and
109. See Danwood M. Chirwa, Obligations of Non-State Actors in Relation to Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights Under the South African Constitution, 7 MEDITERRANEAN J. HUM. RTS. 29, 43-49 (2003)
(discussing the emerging jurisprudence of indirect obligations).
110. It appears the indirect mode is added in the last stage of the drafting, as a provision for this is
not found in the Draft Norms on Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, U.N. Comm. on Hum. Rts., 54th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP.1 (2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/
0/8af5cb0c00839902c 1256c010054b660/$FIIE/G0213899.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
111. Such an obligation on states is discemable, among others, from paragraph I of the Norms:
"States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including ensuring that
transnational corporations and other business enterprises respect human rights." (emphasis added). See
generally U.N. Norms, supra note 6. See also Chirwa, supra note 109. See cases cited supra note 23.
112. See U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 15. TNCs are also obliged to "periodically report on and take
other measures fully to implement the Norms." Id. It is, however, not very clear to whom such reporting is
to be made.
applying the Norms themselves, I will call this the strategy of "internalization."
The strategy of internalization is directed towards developing a corporate
culture of respect to human rights. TNCs should give appropriate training to
their managers and workers as an initial step for building such a culture." 3
More importantly, such human rights culture is not to be confined to the narrow
legal structure of TNCs but has to extend to their contractors-suppliers et al, as
TNCs are obligated to apply and incorporate the Norms in the relevant
contracts/business arrangements. "4 TNCs shall either ensure that their business
partners comply with human rights obligations or cease to work with them." 5
Though TNCs might contend that this is an impractical expectation, the Norms
rightly place the obligation directly and squarely on TNCs because only TNCs
are in a position/power to achieve this result.
Second, TNCs "shall be subject to periodic monitoring and verifying by
United Nations, other international and national mechanisms already in
existence or yet to be created.""..6 It can be termed "external" strategy in view
of the focus being on external agencies keeping an eye on the conduct of TNCs.
Though the Norms have not elaborated upon the details of proposed monitor-
ing/verification, the appended commentary suggests that the UN human rights
treaty bodies should monitor implementation of these Norms, among others,
through the "creation of additional reporting requirements for states."" 7 A role
is also envisaged for other UN special agencies, including the Commission on
Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights." 8 But it is surprising that there is no specific mention of the
Global Compact despite the fact that it is a UN initiative especially directed
towards corporate social responsibility. Moreover, the reliance on state
reporting to ensure that TNCs comply with the Norms is too optimistic to be
realistic," 9 more so when states act in connivance with TNCs on many
occasions. "0
113. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 17.
114. U.N. Norms, supra note 6,115. See also Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 17-18.
115. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 18.
116. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 16.
117. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 18-19.
118. Id.
119. The mechanism is already under serious stress to prevent human rights abuses even by states.
See James Crawford, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: A System in Crisis?, in THE FUTURE OF UN
HUMAN RIGHTSTREATY MONITORING4-11 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000) (highlighting some
of the factors responsible for this stress). See also Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness
of the UN Human Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, 53rd Sess., Agenda Item 15, 37-52, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/74; U.N. C.H.R., 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/75 (2000); UN Human Rights Treaties:
Facing the Implementation Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
SYSTEM IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 682-90, (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000).
120. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi point out three types of corporate complicity: direct, indirect,
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It can be said that though the Norms rightly take cognizance of the
necessity of putting in place an external international regulatory regime to make
TNCs accountable for human rights violations, they fall short of moving in the
right direction. For example, it requires thorough investigation whether a new
international body is created for this purpose 2' or the existing institutions,
including the WTO, are molded to enforce human rights obligations against
TNCs. "'22 What is, however, appreciable that the commentary to paragraph 16
not only encourages trade unions and NGOs to invoke the Norms for their
actions/dealings with TNCs, but also hope that the Norms could be used as
benchmarks of ethical investing.2 3 Such a provision is important because the
success of any mechanism aimed at enforcing human rights obligations on
TNCs requires, in addition to traditional enforcement tools, evolution and
employment of new enforcement strategies.
2. Indirect Mode
Under the indirect mode, the Norms expects that "states should establish
and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative framework for ensuring
that the Norms" are implemented by the TNCs. 124 It is interesting to note that
this is the only provision that is drafted in terms of 'should', a deviation which
is difficult to explain especially when the obligation of states to respect and
promote human rights also includes the responsibility to ensure/secure respect
from other natural or legal persons operating within its territory. 25 The
and silent. Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 26, at 342-49. See also Ramasastry, supra note 9, at 100-04
(examining in detail the nature and level of corporate complicity with states that should give rise to civil and
criminal liability); Ratner, supra note 23, at 500-06.
121. See e.g., the proposals cited by William Meyer and Boyka Stefanova. Meyer & Stefanova,
supra note 106, at 520-21. See also Monshipouri et al., supra note 9, at 983-86.
122. I have elsewhere argued that the proposed international mechanism could be based upon a
partnership between the UN and the WTO. Deva, supra note 16. See generally Emst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact'for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide
Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 621 (2002). Contra Alston, supra
note 106; Robert Howse, Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on
Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 651 (2002).
123. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 19. It could be said that by introducing the
notion of "ethical investment" the Norms are catching up with a global trend towards promoting ethical or
socially responsible investment. For example, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission is
currently in the process of finalizing guidelines regarding product disclosure statements (PDS). See AusTL.
SEC. & INV. COMM' N, DISCLOSURE ABOUT LABOUR STANDARDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS IN PRODUCT DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS- DRAFT ASIC S 101 3DAGUIDELINES FOR PRODUCT
ISSUERS (2003), available at http://www.asic.gov.au (last visited Sept. 15, 2003); see generally AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT'S DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE, CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY-AN
INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE: THE MAYS REPORT (2003).
124. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 17.
125. Id. 1 1. See also Chirwa, supra note109.
appended commentary elaborates further the above expectation of the UN
Norms: the governments should not only make these Norms widely known but
also use them as a model for initiating legislations or taking administrative
processes, including national human rights commissions. 126  Whether this
provision makes any difference or not, will depend to a large extent on how the
courts, both municipal and international, make use of this directory mandate. 27
In case TNCs fail to comply with the Norms, they shall provide reparation
to individuals, entities and communities adversely affected by such failure.2 8
The reparation, which may take the form of restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for any damage done or property taken, must be prompt, effective
and adequate. 29 This provision is significant because of at least three reasons.
First, it implies that victims of corporate human rights abuses shall have a right
to claim compensation. Thus, TNCs should no longer be able to present
payment of monetary compensation as a sign of mercy shown to the victims. 3
Second, as the compensation could be claimed even by communities, presum-
ably for violation of collective rights, this will take care of those situations
when it is difficult to attribute harm to identifiable individuals. Third, the
provision expressly acknowledges that reparation, in order to serve any real
purpose, should be prompt, effective and adequate.
Despite the above positives, one difficult issue survives regarding the
adequacy of compensation. Courts, both at municipal and international levels,
face an obvious difficulty in quantifying damages for human rights violations,
especially when victims and TNCs belong to countries placed in vastly different
stages of economic development. It seems that the guidance offered by the
Norms-that courts, while determining damages, shall apply the Norms in
pursuance to national/international law' 3 -- does not reach to the root of the
problem. The quantification of damages invariably raises the question about
the value of life, say, of a worker in an Indian factory qua a worker employed
in a similar factory in the US or Europe. To put it differently, whether the loss
of life should have same monetary value everywhere or not? Another
ambiguity remains regarding the objectives sought to be achieved by the
provision for reparation; it is not clear whether deterrence is one of the
underlying themes. If deterrence is one of objectives behind reparation, which
126. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 20.
127. See sources cited supra note 23.
128. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 18.
129. Id.
130. For example, in the Bhopal case the settlement order of the Supreme Court read: "Tbe aforesaid
payments [of $470 million] shall be made to the Union of India as claimant andfor the benefit of all victims
of the Bhopal gas disaster ... and not as fines, penalties, or punitive damage." Union Carbide Corp. v.
Union of India A.I.R., 1990 S.C. 273, 275 (India) (emphasis added).
131. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 18.
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in my view should be, then there should be a specific provision for awarding
punitive damages. If so, what should be the test for determining punitive
damages-whether the proportionality of the harm caused or the economic
capacity of the concerned TNC should play any role in this regard?'32
B. What is still Lacking?
Effective and efficient implementation of the Norms holds the key to the
extent of their success in achieving the intended objective. Though the Norms
make a sincere attempt in formulating the provisions for implementation, in my
view they fall short of what is required. In my view, the UN Norms suffer from
at least following three glaring omissions which might seriously hamper the
prospect of their viable enforcement.
1. Multiple Sanctions
As explained above, the Norms stipulate implementation provisions. But
which coercive measures could follow if certain TNCs fail to implement the
mandate of the Norms? It seems that the response of the Norms to such a
situation is two-fold. First, the expectation is that states will establish the
necessary legal framework to ensure that TNCs comply with their human rights
standards under the Norms and also otherwise.13 3 It is logical to assume that
provisions related to sanctions could be part of such legal framework. It can,
however, be said that administering sanctions solely or even predominantly
through states might not fulfill the desired results. Past experiences show that
on many occasions, if not always, states either act in complicity with TNCs'
132. The Indian Supreme Court has laid down a principle of punitive damages that is worth
considering. Oleum Gas Leak Case (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India) A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1086. Justice Bhagwati
observed that "the measure of compensation in the kind of cases referred to in the preceding paragraphs [i.e.,
liability of an enterprise dealing with hazardous or inherently dangerous activity] must be correlated to the
magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. Id. The
larger and more prosperous the enterprise, greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the
harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity
by the enterprise." Id. at 1099-1100.
133. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 117.
134. For an example, see the activities of Enron in India and Unocal in Myanmar.
or tacitly align with them.'35 This is besides the fact that any municipal system
will always find it difficult to impose sanctions on a transnational entity.'36
Second, TNCs which fail to implement the Norms are obligated to pay
reparation to those adversely affected.'37 Reparation is undoubtedly an
important, and from the perspective of victims also useful, remedy, but it is
doubtful whether reparation alone could coerce TNCs to respect the Norms.
Ideally, the UN Norms should employ three types of sanctions against TNCs:
civil, criminal and social. Reparation under the Norms seems to be used only
as a civil remedy as it is unclear whether it is also intended to be utilized as a
criminal sanction. It is important that the Norms not only resort to criminal
sanctions against TNCs (and their human hands) but also effectively invoke
social sanctions-by which I mean outcast of the concerned corporation from
the market through blacklisting/ban on commercial dealings, and also pressure
emanating from consumers, investors, media and NGOs' 38-to enforce the
human rights obligations against TNCs.'39 Further, it is equally vital that these
multiple sanctions flow, wherever possible, from international as well as non-
state sources, including market forces.
2. Enforcement Mechanism
A strong enforcement mechanism is sine qua non for effective implemen-
tation of the Norms. Being alive to this, the Norms conceive of multiple
monitoring and verification mechanisms, both at national and international
135. For an example see the response of the US government which is clear from the following two
facts. First, the U.S. Department of State, in a letter submitted to the District Court of Columbia, has taken
the stand that the adjudication of human rights violation case against ExxonMobil Corporation by the U.S.
courts might have "serious adverse impact on significant interests of the United States." Secondly, on May
8, 2003, the US Justice Department, in an amicus curie brief submitted in Unocal case before the Court of
Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, has questioned the very basis of judicial invocation of the ATCA against the
US based MNCs for redressing human rights violations abroad. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of
America, John Does I, et al. v. Unocal Corp., et al., 2002 WL 31063976 (Nos. 00-55603,00-56628, available
at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/05/dojO50803.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2003). See generally Elliot J
Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153
(2003).
136. For example, the UCC and its officials are successfully avoiding the pending criminal
proceedings in India. See also Deva, supra note 16, at 48-49 (explaining various substantive and procedural
difficulties associated with state-based regulation of TNCs).
137. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 18.
138. See Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights through
Deceptive Advertising Law 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 603,607, 613,624 (2000); Macek, supra note 84,
at 110-15; Monshipouri et al., supra note 9, at 986-87.
139. Though the Commentary to paragraphs 15 and 16 indicates that the U.N. Norms conceive a role
for civil society organs and stakeholders, generally that role still needs to be clearly demarcated and
institutionalized.
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levels. 4 ' But it seems that the idea is still undeveloped; no definite and/or
viable framework for such a mechanism is ascertainable from the Norms, and
the appended commentary invite the Sub-Commission on Human Rights and
other UN bodies "to develop additional techniques for implementing and
monitoring these Norms."'' If the Norms are adopted in its present form, that
is, without any concrete mechanism to supervise the implementation, it will
undoubtedly make a mockery of the Norms, framed admittedly in "non-
voluntary" terms and supported for the first time with implementation
provisions. Therefore, an enforcement mechanism should be put in place
before the Norms being adopted. It is equally critical that the mechanism is
both effective and efficient, that is, it could not only preempt human rights
violations but also offer speedily an adequate remedy to the victims in cases of
violation. For example, the suggestion of monitoring implementation by
existing human rights treaty bodies through additional state reporting
requirement'42 is likely to prove neither effective nor efficient.'43
3. Response to (Mis)use of Procedural Issues
At least two procedural issues-forum non conveniens'"and the liability
of a parent corporation for human rights violations by its subsidiaries'-have
140. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 16.
141. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 18-19. Paragraph 16 contemplates monitoring
and verification also by national/international institutions "yet to be created." U.N. Norms, supra note 6,
16.
142. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 18-19.
143. It is anybody's guess how an already burdened, and in need for reforms, mechanism would cope
up with more than 60,000 TNCs operating in the world. See Halina Ward, Securing Transnational
Corporate Accountability Through National Courts: Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 451, 452 (2001) (citing UNCTAD's 1999 World Investment Report).
144. Jamie Cassels argues that the "doctrine [of forum non conveniens] shields multinationals from
liability for injuries abroad." JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL
144 (1993). Similarly, Justice Doggett, while rejecting the plea of forum non conveniens in a case brought
by the farm workers of Costa Rica against Shell Oil and Dow Chemicals, observed that the doctrine is not
really about convenience but connivance to avoid corporate responsibility. Dow Chem. Co. v. Domingo
Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tex. 1990). See generally D. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in
America and England: A Rather Fantastic Fiction, 103 L.Q. REv. 398 (1987); INCONVENIENT FORUM AND
CONVENIENT CATASTROPHE: THE BHOPALCASE 1-30 (Upendra Baxi ed., 1986); Jaqueline Duval Major, One
Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 650 (1992); Rogge, infra note 147.
145. A cocktail of two principles of corporate law - separate personality and limited liability -
achieve this effect, as demonstrated by many cases. In fact, the U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations
recognized this as early as in 1988.
A further complication arises from the concept of limited liability in corporate law,
This often precludes the extension of liability to the parent entity for the actions or
omissions of the affiliate, and also tends to limit the exercise of jurisdiction over the
2004]
often been (mis)used by TNCs to avoid or delay their responsibility for human
rights violations. 146 The judicial response to these two issues has also, by and
large, helped the cause of TNCs rather than the victims. 147 But the UN Norms
do not address these important procedural issues, in the absence of which any
implementation mechanism, even if equipped with multiple sanctions, can
hardly deliver justice to the victims.
The Norms should, therefore, respond to the above procedural challenges
by offering principled 148 guidelines to be followed by courts. For example, on
the issue of the liability of a parent corporation for human rights violations by
its subsidiaries, the Norms could adopt the enterprise theory rather than the
entity theory as the basis of liability. 149 This will ensure that the courts instead
of deciding the issue afresh in each and every case, which is not only time
consuming but also leads to inconsistent decisions, may determine the question
of liability swiftly and in accordance with a predictable principle rather than
wagering between various principles. 5 ° This will also send a signal to those
parent corporations which conduct more hazardous business through financially
weaker subsidiaries' 5' and then keep distance by design with them in order to
parent entity by either the home or host country in respect of the actions of the
affiliate.
U.N. CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 22 (1988).
146. Besides these two issues, conflict ofjurisdiction and choice of law are other problematic areas.
147. A more positive judicial attitude is though visible in some recent cases. See e.g., Connelly v.
RTZ Corp. plc, 4 All E.R. 335 (House of Lords 1997); Lubbe v. Cape, plc, 1. W.L.R. 1545 (House of Lords
2002). But it is still unclear whether this represents a uniform policy shift all over the world. See generally
Peter Prince, Bhopal, Bougainville and OK Tedi: Why Australian Forum non Conveniens Approach is
Better, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 573 (1998); Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate
Accountability in the Global Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re: Union
Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua and Aguinda 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 299 (2001); Winston Anderson, Forum non
Conveniens Checkmated? - The Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183
(2001).
148. Borrowing from Ronald Dworkin, I use "principle" in the sense of "a standard that is to be
observed ... because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality." RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (Harv. U. Press 1978).
149. See generally Philip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights against Multinational Corporations
under the United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Framework 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (2002)
[hereinafter Blumberg, Conceptual and Procedural Framework]; Philip I. Blumberg, The Increasing
Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities 28
CONN. L. REv. 295 (1996). See also D. Aronofsky, Piercing the Transnational Corporate Veil: Trends,
Developments and the Need for Widespread Adoption of Enterprise Analysis 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
31(1985).
150. Courts in different cases have invoked, or have been urged to invoke, the doctrine of agency,
attribution, alter ago, or piercing of corporate veil to mitigate the rigor of the principle of separate personality.
151. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Torts 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1203, 1205, 1246, n. 179-82 (2002). See also A. Ringleb & S. Wiggins, Liability
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exploit a principle of corporate law which is probably out of tune with the
present day reality of TNCs.'52
Similarly, the existing predominant judicial approach to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens also require adjustment, at least when cases are tried by
municipal courts, so as to prevent its abuse for evading liability for human
rights violations. The Norms should take a lead in this regard. Blumberg
suggests that presence of international human rights should be considered
among the public interest factors to be taken into consideration by courts while
hearing the plea of forum non conveniens. 53 It can further be argued that since
realization of human rights is no longer a matter internal to national boundaries,
in cases involving human rights violations the doctrine offorum non conveniens
should be invoked only when courts are of the view that a particular forum is
clearly and grossly inconvenient to the defendant.
5 4
V. CONCLUSION
Many actors-from states' 55 to international institutions,"16 academia,
media and civil society organs157-are engaged in a search for evolving an
effective as well as efficient regulatory framework of TNCs' accountability for
human rights violations. The UN initiatives hold a prominent, if not central,
place in such a quest; the Norms being the most recent, and also to date most
promising, effort on the part of the UN. The Norms seems to have benefited
from the exposure of the infirmities of its predecessor as well as other current
and Large Scale, Long-Term Hazards 98 J. POL. ECON. 574 (1990).
152. See PILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE
SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 1-20 (1993).
153, Blumberg, Conceptual and Procedural Framework, supra note 149, at 526.
154. See generally Peter Prince, supra note 147 (arguing that the Australian approach of "clearly
inappropriate forum" is better than the approach of "most suitable forum" adopted by the courts in the United
States and United Kingdom).
155. See e.g., Corporate Code of Conduct Bill of 2000, H.R. 4596, 106th Cong., available at
http:llthomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlquery/z?c106:H.R.4596 (last visited Oct. 6, 2003); the Corporate Code of
Conduct Bill of 2000 (Austl.), available at http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/ Repository/Legis/Bills/
Linked/I 3020235.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003). Both bills, however, could not be passed as law.
156. One can easily identify the initiatives on the part of the OECD, ILO, UN and the EU. See supra
notes 5, 6, 7, 12, and 13.
157. The efforts of the part of Human Rights Watch, Corporate Watch, Greenpeace, Business for
Social Responsibility, Corporate Social Responsibility Forum, etc., have been commendable, and have
contributed to putting the issue of corporate social responsibility on the center stage. See Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A Liberal Theory ofinternational Law, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 240, 243 (2000). See also
Frieda De Koninck, How Can We Influence the Practices of Transnational Actors? The "Clean Clothes"
Campaign: How Can We Fight for Economic and Social Rights when Faced to Transnational Actors?, in
SOCIAL ALERT, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL Rights: A Challenge for Peace and Development in a
Global World 58-70 (2002), available at http://www.paxchristi.net/PDF/DEC06E02.pdf (last visited Dec.
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regulatory regimes of corporate human rights responsibility, as they apparently
seek to remedy some of those infirmities. However, certain lacunae still survive
which, in my view, might hamper the efficacy of the Norms and neutralize the
edge that they claim over their counterparts.
I have argued in this article that though the Norms revive the hope for
establishing a legally binding international regime of corporate responsibility
for human rights violations, they represent an imperfect step, albeit in the right
direction. It is critical for the efficacy of the Norms that imperfections related
to both formulation and implementation of TNCs' human rights obligations are
further deliberated upon thoroughly before any move towards the adoption of
the Norms. In sum, it is argued that the Norms should not only deduce human
rights obligations of TNCs from state-focal international treaties and maintain
a distinction between aspirational and operational standards of human rights,
but also establish a robust enforcement mechanism which invokes multiple
sanctions. Besides, the Norms should also take the lead in responding to
hindrances posed by the procedural issues related to forum non conveniens and
the liability of a parent corporation for human rights violations by its subsidiar-
ies.
Though at this stage it is difficult to predict with certainty whether the UN
Commission on Human Rights will adopt the Norms in March 2004, or whether
they will become legally binding stricto sensu in the near future, in my view it
might be more appropriate that some of the issues raised herein are deliberated
upon further before a formal adoption of the Norms. As far as the binding
nature of the Norms is concerned, it will be ideal if they take the shape of a
legally binding instrument; but this is not to suggest that the non-binding Norms
could not contribute, in some way, to rectify the current state of TNCs'
impunity for human rights violations. What is more important, however, that
a healthy debate amongst all the affected parties on an issue of vital signifi-
cance ensues, and if that happens, the present article would achieve its modest
objective of highlighting the positives and exposing some of the inadequacies
of the Norms.
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